How would you recognise an expert coach if you saw one? by Wharton, Lee & Rossi, Tony
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Wharton, Lee & Rossi, Tony
(2015)
How would you recognise an expert coach if you saw one?
International Journal of Sport Science and Coaching, 10(2+3), pp. 577-
588.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/65036/
c© Copyright 2013 Multi-Science Publishing Co. Ltd.
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
 1 
Would you recognise an Expert Coach; if you saw one?  
 
Abstract  
A review of the literature that frames coaching practice and specifically the 
formation and determination of expert coaching practice reveals a body of 
research that lacks continuity. It has recently been argued that much of the 
instability surrounding our professional interpretation of coaching practice 
stems from a penchant for subjective investigation. This analysis draws on a 
review of over 100 peer reviewed articles, chapters and books – all published 
within the last 35 years, that address the notion of coaching practice. The 
findings of this analysis suggests that much of the research used to establish 
conceptual clarity fails to distinguish between highly organised or efficient 
coaching practice and expert coaching practice. This paper concludes with 
some recommendations from alternate paradigms which suggest that 
expertise in interceptive sports coaching may be better theorised and suitably 
identified through a lens of the growing ideas surrounding ‘emergence’. 
A short story 
At a recent junior age group football (soccer) game a coach was plying his trade 
with a group of players who were taking their first steps onto a full size field, 
with a full quota of players. It was amazing to watch how, with the consummate 
ease, and apparent success, this relatively anonymous football coach went about 
his business. In what to some might be perceived as an unenviable task, this 
voluntary coaching practitioner developed a solid and deep understanding of the 
roles and responsibilities of the positions associated with a three, five, two field 
formation.  Further, as if to punctuate his coaching prowess he achieved this 
higher order understanding by simultaneously reinforcing the abstract concepts 
of field position and possession. After the session and on the drive home, the 
first author was compelled to quiz the young player / passenger beside him (his 
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son) about his roles and responsibilities as a right-winger and left defender – 
both the positions in which he had trained. It was enlightening and altogether 
unexpected to listen to the depth and breadth of understanding inherent in the 
lad’s descriptions that clearly connected to his engagement in the previous 
learning episodes. This experience alone provided the impetus for the search for 
a deeper understanding and a serious reconsideration of the descriptors and 
parameters of ‘expertise’ in sports coaching and furthermore whether or not 
these can be put into service, to cultivate or indeed confirm expertise. At the 
same time a further and somewhat more foreboding question emerged: were we 
stifling the distribution of knowledge and expert practices in sports coaching? 
This paper is drawn from a large and lengthy study and as such it represents part 
of that search for understanding  
Introduction 
The study of expertise has long been a challenge for academic research across a range 
of disciplines and more recently this includes disciplines and sub-disciplines 
associated with sport [1].  From the fields of cognitive and behavioural psychology, 
the concepts of expertise and the acquisition of expert knowledge have intrigued 
researchers concerned with the noticeable disparity between individual levels of 
human task performance and individual rates of skill acquisition to perform those 
tasks. This perceptible imbalance among human beings for acquiring complex skills 
indicates a variable aptitude for the encoding, storing and recalling of complex skills. 
It is this diversity that has provided a serviceable cornerstone for a research focus 
addressing optimal levels of human performance, and more recently, research 
targeting intervention and facilitation mechanisms that are designed to enhance the 
acquisition of expertise. This scenario has a long and rich tradition in sport, and while 
studies that concern enhanced skill acquisition (particularly in industrial settings) have 
been conducted since the turn of the twentieth century [2-3], the notion of expert 
performance in a sporting context is more recent and perhaps remained largely 
untouched until the involvement of cognitive psychology in the 1970s.  
Abraham, Collins and Martindale [4] suggest that professional inquiry 
regarding expertise in sport has only reached prominence in the last thirty-five years. 
Furthermore, expertise in coaching as an off-shoot of the expert sports performance 
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paradigm has much more recently attracted the necessary academic interest that it 
warrants. However, a new research vein targeting the analysis of abstract notions such 
as mental constructs [5-7], and the coupling of perception with action and the decision 
making process has ensured that the notion of expertise in a sporting contexts 
generally and sports coaching specifically, has received significant attention of late 
[see 4, 6, 8]. 
 Our intentions in this paper are to briefly review how ‘expertise’ is broadly 
understood in sport generally and at the same time identify the research trends that 
have led to this understanding. We then connect these trends to coaching research in 
order to offer a potential way to explore some possibilities related to how coaching 
expertise might be recognised and in doing so identify what sort of questions might be 
worth asking related to the acquisition of coaching expertise. 
Research Trends in Sports and Coaching Expertise 
In light of the relatively short time span defining the examination of expertise in sport, 
four distinct research phases can be identified as having contributed to our current 
understanding of expertise in sporting and coaching contexts. The first of these phases 
occurred prior to the 1960s, a period generally dominated by behavioural 
psychologists prosecuting the notion of ‘motor behaviour’ theory [9]. This research 
phase advocated an information processing model that explained expertise as a 
tangible reduction in the time taken to complete a stimulus – response selection task 
(reaction time) and or a stimulus – response initiation task (movement time) generally 
grouped together as inputs and outputs. Drawn primarily from the world of industrial 
task performance, particularly but not exclusively in manufacturing and in office 
related work, research studies within this field involved calculating the time expired 
in completing vocational skills such as box making, assembly line tasks, telegraphing 
and typing. It was inferred that meanings extrapolated from the research of vocational 
skills could provide some insight into better understanding the acquisition of expertise 
in the realm of sports performance. 
The impetus for the second phase of research targeting expert performance in 
sport stems from a professional concern by experimental psychologists regarding the 
capacity of the information processing model to cope with the sheer volume of 
possible motor functions, patterns and skills a human might be required to remember. 
Hodge, Starkes and MacMahon [10] suggest that much of the research that examined 
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the role and contribution of such models on sporting expertise of the 1970s relied on 
experimental psychologists and cognitive psychology. Typical research of this period 
involved models and schemas such as Adam’s closed loop theory [9], Schmidt’s 
schema theory [9] as well as Ericsson and Smith’s Expert Performance Approach [13, 
14] as a mechanism for comparing the performances of skilled athletes with less 
skilled athletes (novices). Research of this period was domain specific and generally 
involved the recall and recognition of information gathered through the senses but 
necessarily dominated by visual input. A primary research objective that characterises 
this phase of research was a preoccupation with knowledge structures – as a means of 
determining if such a concept could be used as a parameter for determining expertise. 
A further phase of the research agenda defining expert performance in sport is 
characterised by the introduction of equipment capable of tracking and recording eye 
movements. Vickers [15] suggests that technological developments have contributed 
towards the consolidation of a perceptual-cognitive research agenda. Technological 
developments in recording equipment have enabled researchers to analyse data that 
derives from a linking of retinal movement patterns with verbal-response recordings. 
Similar to the preceding research phase, this chapter of research was driven by a focus 
for determining the differences between expert and novice performers within specific 
sport domains. However, just like the preceding phase, this research period was 
subsequently hampered by professional contention regarding the parameters used for 
identifying and selecting domain specific experts to be studied. Chi [16] most 
pertinently supports such a stance by declaring research of this period was 
preoccupied by the ‘absolute’ and ‘relative paradigms’ used for determining expertise. 
However, in spite of concerns regarding the location of expertise, this period of 
research is strongly attributed with giving rise to subsidiary notions such as 
‘deliberate practice’ [17]. 
The most recent, still evolving, and perhaps most compelling field of research 
to examine and analyse the notion of expertise in a sporting context is an 
amalgamation of methodologies and concepts drawn from Ecological Psychology 
[18] and similar derivatives of dynamic systems theory (DST) [9, 19]. Hodge, Starkes 
and MacMahon [10] support this position by suggesting the recent emergence of 
associated techniques from alternative paradigms (such as ecological psychology and 
DST) have added considerably to our understanding of influential performances in 
sport. A major advantage associated with such paradigms is that they view perception 
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and action as a coupled response to task instability rather than separate entities. 
Ecological Psychologists suggest that highly skilled movements are the product of an 
individual’s ability to initiate the appropriate movement response to a changing task. 
Researchers in this field describe the product of this perception action coupling 
process as emergent actions – allowing the action to emerge from the field rather than 
a premeditated and pre-organised movement stored somewhere in the central nervous 
system. This notion of emergent actions evolving from a perception-action exchange 
is the first indication of research that simultaneously recognises the interaction of both 
perception and action and acknowledges that highly skilled sports performance occurs 
when athletes/sports people are highly attuned to their environments. A most 
interesting feature of this ecological perspective is the suggestion that perception is 
not only a determining component of sports performance but also one that can be 
trained. The proximity of this position to the developing discourse surrounding 
complexity thinking is not hard to detect. Though there are genealogical differences 
the connections between ecological psychology and complexity thinking are best 
considered through the idea of adaptation. It is a position taken up by Rossi and 
Carroll (20) who drawing on a range of intellectual traditions, argue that intelligent 
performers might be best defined by their capacity to adapt to rapidly changing 
environmental conditions rather than any analytical function after the fact. In other 
words ‘in the moment’ decision-making (21) may be a better way to categorise 
‘expertise’ than post event articulations of strategy, or intent. Rossi and Carroll (20) 
point to a range of both empirical and philosophical work that suggests the 
affordances or to use Popper’s (22) term propensities within any given context (the 
constraints that define the context and the possible scenarios that might arise) are in a 
high state of volatility. However, Todd and Gigenrenzer (23) regard such constraints 
as liberating since, as they suggest, decisions for action ‘emerge’ from the “the joint 
effect of two interlocking components: the internal limitations of the (human) mind, 
and the structure of the external environments in which the mind operates” (p. 148). 
In other words Todd and Gigenrenzer argue that in order to make good decisions we 
should let the world do some of the work. This ecological approach relies on Simon’s 
idea that humans tend to draw on approximate methods to undertake most tasks but 
also search for more information within ever changing contexts. Given the nature of 
the rate of change within systems, the internal heuristic device humans draw upon 
need to be fast. Hence heuristics need to be matched to particular environments to 
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facilitate adaptive decisions. These central ideas of Todd and Gigenrenzer have appeal 
since at first glance at least they suggest how the uncertainty within complex systems 
can be accommodated and how actions and decisions within evolving environments 
(such as a game) can be facilitated. As Jones (24) suggests: 
 
People never make decisions in isolation. They interact with 
others, who themselves have decision strategies. They must 
modify their goals in light of the social milieu in which they find 
themselves. Indeed, some analysts have argued that preferences 
should be viewed as fluid, not fixed, because of the necessity to be 
flexible in the face of changing circumstances. (p. 308) 
 
If we accept that our lives and the systems in which they function (sport being among 
them) are guided as much by uncertainty as they are certainty then the idea of 
‘emergence’ of phenomenon (that induce emergent of naturalistic decision making), 
as being bound up in fluctuating propensities of systems seems reasonable. This in 
turn requires us to accept the possibility at least that systems self-organize around the 
propensities within the system itself. This further suggests that when this principle is 
applied to say sports coaching, linearity in decisions making not only seems unlikely, 
it seems untenable. Since sport (regardless of what sport) is a dynamic structure where 
environmental stability is unlikely, it is structured by uncertainty rather than certainty. 
This in turn at least forces us to consider that many sports are structured around 
instability rather than stability. This means that there are a large number of 
propensities within the system, some of which will happen and some of which will 
not. A linear (predictable) set of decisions to a coaching problem is unlikely to be 
successful. However being able to adapt allows a greater possibility of success. The 
key then is being able draw on fast feedback systems and frames of reference that 
allow an image of possible outcomes. 
It is clear then at this point that an appealing conjuncture with coaching 
expertise starts to appear. The unifying aspect of this specialist research agenda is the 
consideration that through a greater understanding of how it is that an expert produces 
and reproduces a desirable behaviour, educators would be better positioned to elicit 
similar behaviours in less experienced practitioners. This might seem overly 
simplistic not to mention optimistic and some academics and coaching practitioners 
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are inclined to disagree with the initial premise that coaching practitioners can be 
trained to achieve the higher echelons of expertise.  For example Klein and Hoffman 
[25] suggest that as tempting as the idea of fast-tracking expertise is, there isn’t yet a 
tangible case to support such a possibility, especially with regards to decision making. 
This perspective offered by Klein and Hoffman is perhaps strengthened when one 
considers the analysis of expertise in interceptive1 sport coaching. This research area 
is populated with published generalisations that ambiguously describe the practices of 
expert practitioners as ‘maxims of practice’ [8], ‘tacit knowledge structures’ [26, 27] 
and ‘experiential knowledge development’ [28, 29, 30]. As a consequence there 
remains academic and professional belief that expertise is best developed through 
years of experience.  However, while congruent research to the Klein and Hoffman 
(25) perspective is ample, it would be naïve to suggest that experience alone equates 
to expertise or that appropriately constructed coach education programs could not 
enhance the opportunity to acquire, develop or display attributes that define expert 
coaching behaviour. 
Position Outline  
While acknowledging the thoughts of Klein and Hoffman (25), it is the position of 
this paper that much of the academic argument that aligns with the ‘expertise as the 
consequence of experiential knowledge’ perspective is restrained by the limits of 
research design. While recognising the role that both behavioural and cognitive 
psychology have played in the development of our understanding of expertise in 
coaching, this paper suggests that in terms of ‘interceptive games’ [10] many of the 
existing research conclusions regarding expert coaching practice have unintentionally 
distorted the criteria used by the coaching profession to distinguish between highly 
organised coaches and expert coaching ‘practice’. We would argue that much of the 
research in this area has tended to settle for exemplars of organisation and efficiency 
as indicators of expertise in interceptive sport coaching. The current research agenda 
has served its purpose in developing a comprehensive understanding of the structured 
tasks associated with efficient coaching practices; however, expertise is a complex 
concept and one that certainly exceeds the indicators of efficiency. Hence we are 
                                                 
1 Interceptive sports are those that involve two opposing teams of interacting players.  
 
 8 
convinced that expertise in interceptive sport coaching could be better theorised and 
more suitably identified through a lens of the growing ideas surrounding ‘emergence’.  
Again acknowledging the seminal findings of early research that examines 
coaching expertise, it is the position of this paper that much of these earlier research 
endeavours have been limited in either locating or establishing a suite of key 
performance indicators for expertise in coaching practice. Werthner and Trudel [31] 
suggest as much in their declaration that determining quality remains a central issue 
hindering our professional understanding of expertise in coaching practice. Lyle [28] 
suggests that an academic propensity for conflation has resulted in a body of research 
that has tried to locate expertise by comparing coaching practice with other well-
established domain specific fields of knowledge. As a consequence, it is argued that 
our current understanding of coaching practice – particularly at the high performance 
end, is incomplete as the dominate research frameworks that shape our current 
understandings are grounded in unrelated, isolated and fragmented interpretations of a 
complex process. 
Rather than struggle for lucidity in a body of research that is already limited 
by contentious claims to conceptual clarity, researchers aligned with ecological 
psychology (and other alternative paradigms) suggest that an alternate model for 
locating expertise in coaching practice is required [see 32-34]. It is the growing 
perspective of ecological psychology that rather than continuing to extrapolate 
expertise from other domain specific performance areas, expertise in interceptive 
sports coaching can be more effectively demonstrated by analysing a practitioner’s 
ability to use environmental information in concert with existing knowledge structures 
to inform future actions that are performed under pressure of time constraints. In light 
of this perspective, we take the position that expertise in coaching may be determined 
by an individual’s ability to receive and utilise the informational cues that furnish an 
emergent action or response such as a decision or a decision making process. Most 
interestingly and perhaps provocatively, such a perspective could potentially imply 
that expertise is equally capable of being located in coaching roles traditionally 
regarded as ‘lower’ in terms of standard and sophistication. We do not advance this 
position over zealously but consider it to be worthy of consideration.  
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Limits to organised and efficient practice as markers of coaching expertise 
Theoretically, the general purpose behind the cognitive research paradigm was to 
identify the explicit elements of a particular behaviour pattern that constitutes an elite 
performance. Schmidt and Lee [9] and Feltovich, Prietula & Ericsson [35] agree, 
suggesting that the cognitive research agenda, perceives expertise as an individual’s 
ability to process domain specific information. While this sectional perspective is 
clearly suited to explaining an individual’s mastery of discrete tasks and rapid serial 
tasks, the same cannot be said for activities performed in contested environments and 
the decisions that presuppose them. Unfortunately the cognitive framework has been 
somewhat crudely applied to coaching. However this cognitive approach is often 
challenged by ecological psychologists and dynamic systems theorists, who suggest 
that highly complex systems like the human body and interceptive environments 
cannot be studied in isolation as all parts of a complex system constantly interact in 
intricate ways. Hence examining coaching practice through a cognitive paradigm has 
failed to suitably acknowledge the interplay that occurs between the various elements 
of a highly volatile yet interactive system. 
The consequence of the dominance of the cognitive paradigm means that the 
practice of expert coaching is portrayed by a body of information that is an 
incomplete and internally disputed set of interpretations of the coaching spectrum. 
Potrac, Brewer, Jones, Armour and Hoff [36] support such a view by suggesting that 
our existing interpretations of expert coaching practices are bound to a knowledge 
disposition that stems from research which embraces a procedural orientation. This 
inclination for a procedural approach to unravelling the practice of expert coaching 
has evolved more by default than by choice. The ‘art’ of interceptive sports coaching 
is perceived as such a multifarious process that it made justifiable sense to reduce the 
‘whole’ to a series isolated interventions. Consequently this demarcation of a 
multifarious process into a series of isolated interventions has resulted in a body of 
research that presents a suite of efficient coaching strategies as the traits of expertise 
and in the process fails to recognise that coaching is a perpetual exchange of related 
information [see 28]. 
This predisposition for promoting efficient and organised practices as 
examples of expertise has been the safest path for a profession that hitherto has been 
reluctant to accurately identify expertise in interceptive coaching in any fashion other 
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than physical success. Chi [16] supports such perspective by claiming that while there 
are several methods for identifying expertise, academic research has relied 
predominantly on a retrospective analysis of behaviours modelled by ineffectually 
identified expert coaching practitioners. This issue of retrospect aligns well with the 
concerns of Nash, Martindale, Collins and Martindale [1] that imply our current 
understanding of expertise has been stalled by the subjective nature with which 
researchers identify expert practitioners. Chi builds on this point by suggesting 
research that examines expertise has historically engaged either an absolute approach 
(acknowledges expertise as an innate and absolute greatness) or relative approach 
(acknowledges expertise by comparison with a less experienced colleague), each of 
which fails to apply a credible process for identifying expertise [16]. 
It is apparent from the literature discussed that without a thorough appreciation of 
coaching as an ongoing process bound in practice, it becomes exceedingly difficult to 
analyse, identify and develop the essential elements that potentially underpin 
expertise in coaching practice. It is the suggestion of this paper that past research 
endeavours have been exceedingly useful for identifying independent process skills 
that enable coaches to efficiently negotiate the boundary markers that define their 
coaching roles. Equally, this same body of research has provided a wealth of 
information that has advanced our professional understanding of general coaching 
principles. However this same research approach has not been able to identify 
practical touchstones of expert practices in coaching [37]. Further to this point, Nash 
et al. [1], Hodges et al. [10] and Chi [16] point out that much of our existing 
understanding of expertise in interceptive sport coaching stems from research that has 
been centred on isolated behaviours and unqualified assumptions of expertise. 
Therefore it is the view of this paper that existing research has often chosen 
inappropriate practitioners to study. Consequently it could be argued that this research 
offer little more than a solid understanding of process skills such as effective practice, 
organisational skills or communication and management strategies that have proven 
advantageous (albeit insufficient) traits in specific high performance environments. 
 11 
Locating some potential Key Performance Indicators of Expert Coaching 
If as indicated above, and the key performance indicators for expertise in coaching 
interceptive sports are restricted to exemplars of capricious actions such as efficient 
behavioural intervention, formal knowledge structures or organisational skills, then 
researchers may have inadvertently committed a professional disservice to many 
community coaches, by primarily focusing analytical attention towards the elite end 
of the coaching continuum. However, a research prevalence for high performance 
coaching environments would imply that participation and developmental coaches are 
either unlikely to demonstrate these arbitrary measures of expertise, or their coaching 
environments are too rich in variables to meet the needs of controlled research. 
Whatever the reasons if effective practice, communication and organisational skills 
are the indicators of expertise in interceptive coaching than it appears quite naïve and 
somewhat elitist to assume that expertise cannot be drawn from the lower ranks of the 
coaching spectrum. 
Even from a cognitive perspective, expertise in a dynamic activity such as coaching 
interceptive sport requires adeptness in a wide-ranging compilation of knowledge 
structures [38]. This need for proficiency in multiple streams of domain specific 
knowledge would suggest that coaching is dissimilar to many other well researched 
domains of expertise [39].  Although some authority areas of the coaching sciences 
may give emphasis to one branch of knowledge ahead of others, most expert coaches 
should be able to demonstrate proficiency in all domain specific knowledge areas that 
are associated with the coaching process [10]. However, to conduct a study of 
analysis that examines a coaching practitioner’s ability to use and manipulate the 
volumes of information of each and every specific knowledge domain would not only 
prove too complicated but would also suggest that there is no interplay between 
domain specific knowledge areas – two issues that have hindered traditional research 
in this area of study. With this in mind a need exists to identify more appropriate 
determinants of expertise, benchmarks that will be more reflective of the processes 
that separate exemplars of expertise from well structured practice. For the purposes of 
locating determinants of expert coaching practice in interceptive sports, we consider it 
important that researchers are guided by the suggestions of ecological psychologists 
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and be directing more attention towards the notion of environmentally driven actions 
such as an emergent decision making. 
Recent research has already proposed the possibility of using a retrospective 
analysis of environmentally driven actions as a potential determinant of expertise. 
Ferrari, Didierjean and Marmeche [40, 41] and Williams, Ericsson, Ward and Eccles 
[42] have successfully drawn attention to experts combining environmental 
information with domain specific knowledge structures for the purposes of encoding 
live interactive action. This notion of encoding live action enables the expert 
practitioner to calculate or prepare future actions.  Ferrari and colleagues have 
identified an ‘avante garde’ like performance trait that separates expert chess players 
from the less experienced players. Similarly, Williams and company have recognised 
that experience military personal can engage a heightened sense of anticipation as a 
means of making informed judgement calls when engaged in simulated work 
environments. While both concepts certainly represent abstract notions of a human 
phenomena, it is the product of these concepts – an emergent decision making 
process, that could stand as a tangible means of determining expertise [see 6, 26, 42, 
43, 44]. 
What is most interesting about Ferrari and colleagues’ suggestions is not that the 
decision making process is proven accurate, but the scope for which the expert can 
retrospectively account for the reasons behind the process. This notion of 
accountability lends itself well to Ericsson and Smith’s [38] call for reproducible 
performances in laboratory environments and cater for the extremely dynamic nature 
of interceptive sports such as invasion games but also games of strategy such as chess. 
Contrary to past research endeavours in expert coaching practice, this perceptual 
cognitive perspective offers a potential means of first identifying and then possibly 
measuring expertise in such a way that it can be developed further.  The focal point of 
this perceptual cognitive perspective for locating expertise in interceptive sports 
coaching is personified by a practitioner’s ability to combine environmental cues with 
domain specific knowledge structures to foresee a means of achieving a set objective 
[see 46]. A primary challenge to the strictly cognitive accounts of expertise was that 
such accounts did little to uncover and point to the vast detail that was relevant to 
decoding the processes coaches used when making decisions in the ‘heat’ of intense 
competition  [42, 47]. It is expected that through a deeper understanding of the 
professional judgements that coaches use to justify their decisions one could gain a 
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greater understanding of what it is that constitutes mastery of the coaching process 
and this might act as a defining principle of expertise 
Summary 
The notion of expertise in interceptive sport coaching remains as contested as the 
sports that these coaching practitioners are involved.  Research currently portrays 
expertise through a number of subjective lenses. For example: Erickson, Cote and 
Fraser-Thomas [30] among others have published research that proposes expertise is 
built on ten or more years, or ten thousand hours, of specific experience.  Yet there 
are other bodies of research that align with the view of Horton, Baker and Deakin [48] 
who suggest expertise is suitably determined by researching coaching practitioners 
who fulfil national coaching roles. According to Chi [16] such subjective determinates 
of expertise whilst of value may well represent an unintended impediment to research 
and subsequently limits our professional understanding of expertise in interceptive 
sport coaching.  
There is a growing body of opinion that suggests that we reconsider the value of 
research that fails to accurately validate the criteria used for identifying expertise. 
Ericsson and Charness [49] support such a statement by suggesting that experts need 
to consistently demonstrate a level of superior practice and not simply be alleged an 
expert.  Abraham, Collins and Martindale [4] concur with such a perspective by 
suggesting that a series of explicit benchmarks need to be developed for future 
research.  However, in spite of this growing opinion, the research field has found it 
difficult to arrive at any level of consensus regarding the determination or location of 
expertise.  
While professional agreement regarding the locale of expertise remains 
unanswered the situation has motivated researchers to look beyond the traditional 
determinants of expertise.  The inevitability of this need for redirecting research has 
recently been highlighted by the work of, Côté and Gilbert [50] who propose expertise 
as being the product of a symbiotic relationship between interpersonal, intrapersonal 
and domain specific knowledge structures. In a similar vein to the suggestions of Côté 
and Gilbert, the advocacy in this paper for the recognition of an Emergent Decision 
Making Process (EDMP) is bound to a coaching practitioner’s capacity to forge and 
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harvest mutually beneficial information streams between domain specific knowledge 
structures and the environmental information that stems from interceptive action.  
This proposal for an Emergent Decision Making Process as a key performance 
indicator of expertise is not entirely new.  The proposition of exploring decision-
making, as a possible indicator of expertise, has ebbed and flowed since the 1980s. In 
fact, the literature reviewed for this paper has identified five unique theories - each 
espousing decision making as a performance indicator of expertise. Models and 
theories such as the Recognition Primed Decision-making Model [51], the Situational 
Awareness Model [52], the Recognition / Meta-cognition Model [53], and the all 
encompassing Naturalistic Decision Making theory as espoused by Klein, Orasanu, 
Calderwood, and Zsambok [51], have each directly or indirectly advocated for a 
greater recognition of decision making as an indicator of expertise. 
A most interesting consistency among these models is that each considers the 
quality of decisions made by practitioners as the measure of expertise. However if we 
are to follow the direction of ecological psychologists, that we re-focus our existing 
research agenda towards the ideas surrounding emerging decisions, then perhaps the 
future of identifying and determining expertise lies in the past. Perhaps if we are to 
enhance our understanding of expertise in interceptive sports coaching than we need 
to revisit the notion of a decisions making process. However rather than focusing on 
the action, the answer to identifying and determining expertise may lie in analysing 
decisions retrospectively. Searching for and qualifying the processes coaching 
practitioners engage (the blending of certain knowledge structures with specific 
information streams) to generate such actions.  
 15 
References 
1. Nash, C., Martindale, R., Collins, D. and Martindale, A., Parameterising 
Expertise in Coaching: Past, present and future, The Journal of Sports 
Sciences, 2012, 30, 985 – 994. 2. Bryan, W.L. and Harter, N., Studies on the Telegraphic Language: The 
acquisition of a hierarchy of habits, Psychological Review, 1899, 6, 345 – 375. 3. Lee, T.D. and Swinnen, S.P., Three legacies of Bryan and Harter: 
Automaticity, variability and change in skilled performance, in Starkes, J.L. 
and Allard, F. eds. Cognitive Issues in Motor Expertise. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 
1993. 4. Abraham, A., Collins, D. and Martindale, R., The Coaching Schematic: 
Validation through expert coach consensus, Journal of Sports Sciences, 2006, 
24, 549 – 564. 5. Côté, J., Salmela, J.H., Trudel, P., Baria, A. and Russell, S., The Coaching 
Model: A Ground Assessment of Expert Gymnastics Coaches’ Knowledge, 
Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 1995, 17, 1 – 17.  6. Ericsson, K.A. and Lehmann, A.C., Expert and Exceptional Performance: 
Evidence of Maximal Adaptation to Task Constraints, Annual Review of 
Psychology, 1996, 47, 273 – 305. 7. Côté, J. and Gilbert, W., An Integrative Definition of Coaching Effectiveness 
and Expertise, International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching, 2009, 4, 
307 – 323. 8. Farrar, N. and Trorey, G., Maxims, Tacit Knowledge and Learning: 
Developing expertise in dry stone walling, Journal of Vocation Education and 
Training, 2008, 6, 35 – 48. 9. Schmidt, R.A. and Lee, T.D., Motor Control and Learning: A Behavioural 
Emphasis, Human Kinetics, Champaign, IL, 2005. 10. Hodges, N.J., Starkes, J.L. and MacMahon, C., Expert Performance in Sport: 
A Cognitive Perspective, in Ericsson, K.A., Charness, N., Feltovich P.J. and 
Hoffman, R.R., eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert 
Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006. 
 16 
11. Adams, J. A closed-loop theory of motor learning, Journal of Motor Behavior 
1971, 3, 2, 111-150. 12. Schmidt, R.A. A Schema Theory of Discrete Motor Skill Learning, 
Psychological Review, 1975, 82, 4, 225-260. 13. Ericsson, K. A. and Smith, J., Toward a general theory of expertise, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 14. Tuffiash, M., Roring, R.W., Ericsson, K.A., Expert Performance in Scrabble: 
Implications for the Study of the Structure and Acquisition of Complex Skills. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2007, 13, 124 – 134. 15. Vickers, J.N., Gaze control in putting, Perception, 1992, 21, 117 – 132. 16. Chi, M.T.H., Two Approaches to the Study of Experts’ Characteristics, in K. 
A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P.J. Feltovich, and R.R. Hoffman, eds., The 
Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006. 17. Ericsson, K.A., Krampe, R.T. and Tesch-Romer, C., The role of deliberate 
practice in the acquisition of expert performance, Psychological Review, 1993, 
100, 363 – 406. 18. Davids, K., Button, C. and Bennett, S., Dynamics of skill acquisition: A 
constraints-led approach, Human Kinetics, Champaign, IL, 2008. 19. Bogartz, R.S., The future of dynamic systems models in psychology in the 
light of the past, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1994, 58, 289-
314 20. Rossi, A. & Carroll, T. Ongoing adaptation as a feature of complexity: further 
thoughts and possible ideas for pedagogy in physical education, in A. Ovens, 
T, Hopper & J. Butler eds., Complexity Thinking in Physical Education, 
Routledge, London, 2012. 21. Light, R. L., Harvey, S. & Mouchet, A. Improving ‘at-action’ decision-making 
in team sports through a holistic coaching approach. Sport, Education and 
Society, 2012, 1 -18. 22. Popper, K. A world of propensities, 1990, Thoemmes, Bristol, UK. 23. Todd, P.M. and Gigenrenzer, G. Bounding rationality to the world. Journal of 
Economic psychology, 2003, 24, 143-165. 
 17 
24. Jones, B.D. Bounded Rationality, Annual Review of Political Science, 297-
321. 25. Klein, G.A. and Hoffman, R., Seeing the invisible: Perceptual/cognitive 
aspects of expertise, in Rabinowitz, M., ed., Cognitive science foundations of 
instruction, Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1993. 26. Saury, J. and Durand, M., Practical Knowledge in Expert Coaches: On-Site 
Study of Coaching in Sailing. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport, 
1998, 69, 254 – 266. 27. Berman, S.L., Down, J. and Hill, C.W.H., Tacit Knowledge as a source of 
competitive advantage in the National Basketball Association, The Academy of 
Management Journal, 2002, 45, 13 – 31. 28. Lyle, J., Sports coaching concepts: A framework for coaches’ behaviour, 
Routledge, London, 2002. 29. Mallett, C. and Côté, J., Beyond Winning and Losing: Guidelines for 
Evaluating High Performance Coaches. The Sport Psychologist, 2006, 20, 213 
– 221. 30. Erickson, K., Cote, J. and Fraser-Thomas, J., Sport experiences, milestones, 
and educational activities associated with high-performance coaches’ 
development, The Sports Psychologist, 2007, 21, 302 – 316. 31. Werthner, P. and Trudel, P., A new theoretical perspective for understanding 
how coaches learn to coach. The Sports Psychologist, 2006, 20, 198 – 212. 32. Michaels, C.F. and Oudejans, R.R.D., The Optics and Actions of Catching 
Flyballs; Zeroing out Optical Acceleration, Ecological Psychology, 1992, 4 
199-222. 33. Beilock, S.L. and Carr, T.H., From Novice to Expert Performance: Memory, 
attention and the control of complex sensori-motor skills, in Williams, A.M.  
and Hodge, N.J. eds., Skill Acquisition in Sport: Research, Theory and 
Practice, Routledge Press, London, 2004. 34. Renshaw, I., Chow, Ji-Yi, Davids, K. and Hammond, J., A Constraints-led 
Perspective to understanding skill acquisition and game play: a basis for 
integration of motor learning theory and physical education praxis? Physical 
Education and Sport Pedagogy, 2010, 15, 117 – 137. 
 18 
35. Feltovich, P.J., Prietula, M.J. and Ericsson, K.A., Studies of Expertise From 
Psychological Perspectives, in Ericsson, K.A., Charness, N., Feltovich, P.J. 
and Hoffman, R.R., eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert 
Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006. 36. Potrac, P., Brewer, C., Jones, R., Armour, K. and Hoff, J., Towards a Holistic 
Understanding of the Coaching Process. Quest, 2000, 52, 186 – 199. 37. Cushion, C., Armour, K. and Jones, R., Coach Education and Continuing 
Development: Experience and Learning to Coach. Quest, 2003, 55, 215 – 230. 38. Allen, S., Expertise in Sport: A Cognitive-Development Approach. The 
Journal of Education, 2007, 1, 9 – 29. 39. Norman, G., Eva, K., Brooks, L. and Hamstra, S., Expertise in Medicine and 
Surgery, in Ericsson, K.A., Charness, N., Feltovich, P.J. and Hoffman, R.R., 
eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006. 40. Ferrari, V., Didierjean, A. and Marméche, E., Dynamic Perception in Chess. 
The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2006, 59, 397 – 410. 41. Ferrari, V., Didierjean, A. and Marméche, E., Effect of expertise acquisition 
on strategic perception: The example of chess. The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 2008, 61, 1265 – 1280. 42. Williams, A.M., Ericsson, K.A., Ward, P. and Eccles, D.W., Research on 
Expertise in Sport: Implications for the Military. Military Psychology, 2008, 
20, 123 – 145. 43. Jones, R.L., Armour, K.M. and Potrac, P., Constructing Expert Knowledge: A 
Case Study of a Top-level Professional Soccer Coach, Sport Education and 
Society, 2003, 8, 213 – 229. 44. Nash, C. and Collins, D., Tacit knowledge in expert coaching: science or art? 
Quest, 2006, 58, 465 – 477. 45. Ericsson, K.A. and Smith, J., Toward a general theory of expertise. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 46. Calvo-Merino, B., Ehrenberg, S., Leung, D. and Haggard, P., Experts see it 
all: Configural effects in action observations. Psychological Research, 2010, 
74, 400 - 4006. 
 19 
47. Ross, K.G., Shafer, J.L. and Klein, G., Professional Judgement and 
“Naturalistic Decision Making”, in Ericsson, K.A., Charness, N., Feltovich, 
P.J. and Hoffman, R.R., eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and 
Expert Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006. 48. Horton, S., Baker, J. and Deakin, J., Experts in Action: A systematic 
observation of 5 national team coaches. International Journal of Sport 
Psychology, 2005, 36, 299 – 319. 49. Ericsson, K.A. and Charness, N., Expert Performance: It’s Structure and 
Acquisition, American Psychologist, 1994, 49, 725 – 747. 50. Côté, J. and Gilbert, W., An integrative definition of coaching effectiveness 
and expertise, International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching, 2009, 4, 
307 – 323. 51. Klein, G.A., A Recogntion-Primed Decision (RPD) Model of Rapid decision 
Making, in Klein, G.A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. and Zsambok, C.E., eds., 
Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, Ablex Publishing 
Corporation, Norwood, NJ, 1993. 52. Endsley, M. R., Towards a theory of situational awareness in dynamic 
systems, Human Factors, 1995, 37, 32 – 64. 53. Cohen, M.S., Freeman, J.T. and Thompson, B.B., Training the naturalistic 
decision maker, in Szambok, C.E. and Klein, G.A., eds., Naturalistic Decision 
Making (257 – 268), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1997. 
 
